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BISMARCK, OTTO VON.
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Historical background, life & career of 19th Cent. German leader. Nationalism, domestic & foreign policy, diplomacy.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Historical background, life & career of 19th Cent. German leader. Nationalism, domestic & foreign policy, diplomacy.
Paper Introduction:
The career of Otto von Bismarck (b.1815, d.1898) - nobleman, count, prince - chancellor, diplomat, self-identified non-statesman - followed a path of such contradictory influences that it is possible to view his actions as both conservative and progressive at the same time. The standard historical judgement is to adopt a perspective of moral superiority in regard to Bismarck's accomplishments. An understandable position: within the Germany he was so instrumental in forging festered the psychology of aggression that led to two World Wars. Yet Bismarck himself warned against such dangers - "Twenty years after my death the great crash will come if things go on as they are going" - his was not a personal philosophy that allowed self-destructive tendencies to grow. Rather, in pursuing a course of "Realpolitik" as opposed to blind ideology, Otto von
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Princeton: D. P. It was against this backdrop of nationalism and Industrial Revolutionthat Otto von Bismarck rose to power and predominance. This throwback to an assertion of theChurch's feudal position of authority was certainly a challenge to nationalsovereignty, inspiring adverse reaction from more than one government inthe European sphere (with echoes of the controversial ideology stilllingering in American politics up until the election of John Kennedy to thepresidency in 196 ). Born in Brandenburgh on April 1, 1815, the very year of Metternich'sgreatest diplomatic triumph, Bismarck was the child of old Prussiannobility (albeit his mother came from the upper bourgeoisie). Evenwhile national sentiment, inspired by opposition to Napoleon, raised nativearmies to push out the French invaders, local governments tended to retainthe foreign-inspired reforms. Napoleon Bonaparte and the French Revolution were theinstigators. However, very real strains in the fabric of federal unity showedalmost at once. Indeed, German farmers shared a near-"capitalist" relationship withthe "commodities" produced by their fields. Along with military logic, Napoleon's conquering forces brought withthem an even more subtle, more lasting influence: republicanism. The Berlin Treaty (July 13, 1878) was a masterpiece of realpolitik,created almost wholly by the personal momentum of Bismarck, who shaped theagenda of debate, directed its course, and made it known that there wouldbe only one month of discussion on the subject - and that there would be nodiplomatic impasse allowed. The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1934 - 1914. Access to key waterways was the goal for both: control of the BlackSea and the Dardanelles Strait for Russia, access to the Adriatic Sea forlandlocked Austria. Inthis they failed to heed the writings of one of Germany's more articulatefirebrands of 1848, Karl Marx[xiii]. That he was a genius atdoing so sometimes overwhelms the sense of simple, straightforwardpracticality inherent to his actions. The prevailing wave of European nationalist sentiment was thegreatest factor at work in influencing the purpose of Bismarck's career -or counter-purpose, as will be demonstrated. The lesson was clear: if the first purpose of agovernment was protection, and if regional government was too weak toeffect such defenses, then a larger, stronger entity was necessary. (At one point, immediately before the San Stefanotreaty, the old mastermind behind Germany's short-and-sweet victories overFrance and Austria did consider advising Austria to attack the paper-thinRussian lines in Greater Bulgaria, but the British factor dissuaded himfrom advocating such brinkmanship.)[xxi] Bismarck took it upon himself toconvene the Congress of Berlin only three months after San Stefano, ameeting of diplomats from the European community where, he declared, hewould act as an "honest broker[xxii]" to mediate a long-term solution tothe Mitteleuropa crisis. The solution, as Bismarck analyzed the situation, was to finda successor to Vienna, a new center of Teutonic power for the Germanpeoples to rally around. An understandableposition: within the Germany he was so instrumental in forging festeredthe psychology of aggression that led to two World Wars. In 1871 Chancellor Bismarck had a ready example to strengthen hisconvictions: the uprising of the Paris Commune against the government ofLouis Napoleon Bonaparte - and against the bourgeoisie. His correspondence protests otherwise, but it wasno coincidence that Bismarck's success with the Viennese representatives tothe Congress were contingent upon future planned association. Still, recognizing theunremitting growth of German industrialism - and its economic consequences- Bismarck refused to dismiss republican reforms that strengthened andimproved the efficiency of government administration. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982..Snyder, Louis L. New York: E. The fact that both empires were weak from within didnot stem their imperialistic ambitions. It was the North German Confederation, fully confirmed in April 1871,that created this new entity of German "empire. The violent chaos we witness daily in theYugoslav regions (Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Boznia, et al.) gives fullmeasure of indictment to the German Chancellor's dismissal of considerationof the indigenous population in his crafting of the Treaty of Berlin thatwas to emerge after only one month of deliberation by the Congress ofBerlin. As can be seen, Bismarck's domestic policy as chancellor was alwaysheavily influenced by external European affairs. This control was built-in to theBismarck-choreographed federal constitution: the king of Prussia wasdesignated hereditary emperor, or "kaiser," of the German empire, while thePrussian state itself was in possession of a dominant bloc of votes in theFederal Council and the "Reichstag" (parliament). Bismarck was thatchancellor. The changes wrought by an evolving Teutonic IndustrialRevolution were the current of history. New York: Random House, Inc., 1967-----------------------Walter M. He was not particular about means: recognizingwell enough that external threat constituted the quickest road to unity,Bismarck conspired to have first Austria (the Seven Weeks War, 1866), thenFrance (the Franco-Prussian War, 187 -71) declare war upon the loose-knitGerman Confederation and North German Confederation, successively. Nationalism was nothing newin Europe, England and France had long since consolidated their regionalinterests into centralized national power focus in the turbulent 17thcentury. He was not always on the mark in his policy-making; Bismarck cannotbe credited with an omniscient response to all situations. "The German's love of the Fatherland has need of a princeon whom he can concentrate his attachment,[xi]" the "Iron Chancellor"wrote, ever the political pragmatist. Prussia's first task, as Bismarck saw it, was to create a positive,constructive national identity by weaning the Germanic states from adependence upon the descending star of Austria - and into an alliancedependent upon Prussia. Although, as a practical expedient and in the name ofconsolidating federal unity over the next twenty years, he was to temperhis extreme stance against liberal and socialist movements, as chancellorof the Reich Bismarck still saw them as a threat to a very young and shakyorder. The proletariat, spawned by theIndustrial Revolution's need for an expanded manpower base, would bynecessity gravitate to a position in opposition to the capitalist "owner"classes - whether of the middle or upper class. This was an open threat to Bismarck's vision of the environmentnecessary for evolution of Germany into a strong European power: peace wasnecessary for the economic progress he felt his country capable of. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.Kent, George O. That his solution was ultimately a failure, though, is alsoevidenced by later developments. It will be popular. He thanked God for the seas atGermany's back, separating her from direct contact with England, but alwaysremembered the military lesson of the Napoleonic Wars: that British navalmight controlled the waves. Within ayear (1879), there was to be a strengthened Dual Alliance agreement betweenthe German kaiser and the Austrian emperor. The resulting hodgepodge of Slavic-oriented Serbs, Germanic Croats, and independent Macedonians and Albanianscut off from their homelands is the resulting heritage of the Treaty'sinsistence upon papering-over threats to the region's stability withtemporal "diplomatic solutions." Although he declared his position as an honest broker at the Congressof Berlin, to Russian eyes Bismarck was clearly leaning in favor of theAustro-Hungarian court. Failing to see that the emerging German national identitycould easily handle the divisive pull of Catholic theology, Bismarck'spolicy ended up in uniting the German liberal factions, not against theCatholics, but against himself. By the 187 s, with unity under the leadership of the Prussian stateachieved, Bismarck felt that Germany was territorially satiated and neededpeace more than anything else. No doubt aided by the fact that he representedthe Prussian court, Bismarck devoted his lifework to giving Germans Berlinto look to as the center of national identity. Letting theliberals of Germany know with whom his sympathies lay, Bismarck directedPrussia's armies to support the French bourgeoisie in brutally retakingParis and erasing the Communards[xiv]. Originallydirected towards a study of the law, with the eventual goal of becoming amember of the Prussian aristocratic bureaucracy, as a young man hisdistaste for both led him to turn to management: first of his family'sestates than, after a conversion to the fundamentalist views of theLutheran "pietists," as an emerging leader of those Prussian aristocratswho, in the 184 s, responded to demands for social egalitarianism withcalls for suppression of revolt. The Industrial Revolution, too, was a fact of lifefor the realpolitik-ian: inasmuch as industrial growth contributed to thestrength and stability of the German nation he was building, ImperialChancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck saw fit to work with those proponentsof the new economic reality - the non-Junker industrialists and middleclass - to a degree that in many ways was far more "liberal" than hisconservative, royalist, agrarian orientation might have permitted had hebeen an ideologue. German liberals were as much prisoners of their own IndustrialRevolution ideology as the Prussian (now imperial) chancellor was shackledin his own opposition to their political philosophy. In this endeavor, the conservative ("I am first and foremost aroyalist[xii]") and autocratic Bismarck was accommodated by therepresentatives of republican nationalism: the liberals. Which is not to say that Bismarck totally rejected the reforms ofdemocratic republicanism as espoused by the liberals; his own pragmaticapproach to politics would not allow so extreme a position. Putnam's Sons,1965), 6 - 76.Snyder, 6.ibid., 7.ibid., 8.Flenley, 28 -281.Snyder, 7.ibid., 7.David Smith & Phil Evans, Marx's KAPITAL For Beginners (NewYork: Pantheon Books, 1982), 7 - 2 .ibid., 24 - 27.Snyder, 225 - 228.Flenley, 282.Richter, 236-237.Snyder, 8.Richter, 239.Snyder, 1.Richter, 238.ibid., 239.Princess Radziwill, quoted in Richter, 24 .ibid., 242.----------------------- 1 Germany in the Age of Bismarck. Eachwar was quickly won by Prussia through well-planned military and diplomaticstratagems. It also allowed the non-Junker German "liberals" to define theirstatus. Throughout the 187 s, Bismarck's response to Pius IX's challenge wasto spearhead a campaign pressing for repressive, anti-Catholic legislation,designated a "Kulturkampf" (struggle between cultures). Thestandard historical judgement is to adopt a perspective of moralsuperiority in regard to Bismarck's accomplishments. The campaign wasprecisely in the interests of German national identity --- and a grossoverreaction. P. The IndustrialRevolution was creating an increasingly vocal middle class in Germany.Those new voices drifted toward the liberal end of the political spectrumin demanding a larger share in policy decision-making. Unlike the liberals,though, who had theory as the foundation of their position, Bismarck'sopposition to republican-dominated German government was based upon apractical consideration of the implications of the on-going IndustrialRevolution. Even at that late date, it can be observed, the IndustrialRevolution in the states of Germany was not the windfall event as it hadbeen in England. Farmers were not serfs, bound to the land, nor were they tithingto Church and lord. It was a veryweak alliance, based upon a nebulous agreement that read along the lines of"should peace be threatened by the aggressive conduct of any power, thethree rulers would consult together as to the policy to be followed[xvii]." It set the pattern for Bismarck's subsequent diplomatic efforts over thenext two decades; as he was to reassure the European diplomatic community,Germany's territorial interests were satisfied, peace for all was best, and"Every war, including a victorious war, is always a misfortune for thecountry that wages it[xviii]." It was not an opinion shared by others during this era ofimperialism. To that end, in 1877 Russia attacked the Balkans. This empire was to lastforty-eight years, until it collapsed militarily in 1918, taking theemperor with it. When he heard about Cyprus he said, 'You have done awise thing. During his career, Bismarck saw that a growing wave of nationalistsentiment was sweeping the German peoples; he accepted that condition andutilized its many nuances to the benefit of the German state herepresented, Prussia. These victories accomplished by fait accompli what lengthystatesmanship and negotiation may well have failed to do: the non-Austrian-dominated German states saw their borders and power expanded dramaticallyin less than a decade - under the leadership of Prussia. A nation likesprogress.' His idea of progress was evidently seizing something.[xxiv]" The Russian ambassador, Gortschakov, was also an aged diplomat - andmore than a little past his peak. Still - ever the pragmatist (albeitbelatedly) - Bismarck took the opportunity of the election of a new popein 1878, Leo XIII, to reach a rapprochement with the Vatican and ease backfrom his harsh stance in the early 188 s. Granted,Bismarck came to power on the strength of his facing down the lower houseof the Prussian legislature on the constitutional issue of financialcontrol of the military. To a certain extent, then, though not predisposed to the Junkers'genetic claim to hereditary political right, the liberals were increasinglyto share the same top-looking-down perspective on events. The political/cultural unity it inspired continues tothis day - interrupted physically, but not psychologically, by the now-fallen Berlin Wall and its East German/West German barbed-wired division ofthe Cold War era[x]. Bismarck and His Times. Modern German History: From the Reformation to the Present Day. Subsequent Napoleonic reforms(cited earlier) altered irreparably the farmer-nobility relationship toland, duty and property. Bismarck had decided to throwin Germany's lot with a cultural relative and, although he made half-hearted attempts at reviving the Three Emperors' League throughout the188 s, this German-Austrian alliance was to be the foreign policy trackpersisting up through World War I. Greater Bulgaria (Bulgaria and the formerYugoslavia) was also theirs - to the alarm of the British fleet anchored atConstantinople (the Ottoman capital) and the Austro-Hungarian forcesmobilized along the souther provinces bordering the new Russian conquests.Despite a hastily-signed Russian/Turkish peace treaty at San Stefano (March3, 1878), the situation was perilously close to erupting into a pan-European war[xix]. Central Europewas the prize here: where long-established spheres of cultural influencehad been overwhelmed by Turkish conquest three centuries earlier, there nowappeared ample opportunity to regain those territories - plus a littlemore. O. The German federal nationhad been, after all, an international consortium of principalities only thedecade earlier; unity was achieved only through his expert combination ofinternational diplomacy and military power plays. It was an excellent fit of personality to position. The states, though no longer sovereignnor free to secede, preserved their own constitutions, rulers,parliamentary and administrative systems. That Bismarck was successful in this effort is evidenced by the factthat war was forestalled until 1914, when the assassination of AustrianArchduke Franz Ferdinand sparked the flames of World War I; the failure oflater diplomats to handle a crisis well cannot be laid against Bismarck'scredit. To grant universal suffrage would be to open the newly-unifiedGerman states to a much more divisive internal power struggle than Bismarckconsidered healthy. In this light, the character of the "liberal," non-Junker politicalmovement from 1815 through to 1848 can be better defined: not composed of"everyman," but, instead, representing the more privileged, owner elementsevolving from the Industrial Revolution's economic makeover of Germansociety. The Industrial Revolution came late to theGerman principalities: what had rocked the English economy in the late17 s was not to affect the primarily agrarian Teutonic peoples until themid-18 s. New York: G. The lameness of 19th centuryliberal philosophy was laid bare. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967.Taylor, Alan J. "It is the destiny of theweak to be devoured by the strong."[vii] He was not particularly aided by the monarchs he served: FrederickWilhelm IV, Wilhelm I, Frederick III, (for a brief term) Wilhelm II - "Ihave seen three kings naked and often enough the behavior of these exaltedgentlemen was by no means kingly"[viii] - men whose distrust for theirtalented chancellor was only swayed by what Bismarck perceived as the royalperspective: "Kings have a peculiar sense of what is to theiradvantage[ix]." Bismarck's actions on their behalves was advantageous forthe kaiser - and for the nation-states of Germany. Thus, a socialist German could,if so inclined, reside in the southern Bavarian states and enjoy ademocratically-oriented political environment - while the state of Prussiafollowed a rigid, Junker-dominated political path more to Bismarck's (andhis king's) personal liking. It was a natural inclination of the German states to consolidatetheir gains of the 186 s-through-'71 into a national identity with Berlinat its center, an inclination cultivated by Bismarck but, nevertheless, notforced. Wrote Disraeli in correspondence home: "He talks asMontaigne writes. The constitution of the new German imperium created a federal state,its power and functions divided between the "Reich" and the twenty-fivestates of which it was composed. It was fanned into renewed fire in the years just prior toBismarck's birth. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968.Smith, David & Evans, Phil. In his evolving view, theHabsburg-ruled Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had heretofore dominatedTeutonic alliances, was too weak to create a Germanic "identity."[vi]Indeed, the very composition of the Viennese imperium bespoke thedestructive tendency of nationalism, its farflung and various ethnicpeoples clamoring for "national" recognition to the detriment of the Empireas a whole. Endnotes BibliographyFlenley, Ralph. He began to define his task interms of finding a constructive, realpolitik-al solution to the Germansituation, both in domestically in regards to the social issues of the day,and on the international (i.e. To their credit, manydid not try. He had some reason to be so alarmed: Pope Pius IX'sVatican Council issued a series of controversial decrees in 187 , includingassertions of papal infallibility and the requiring of absolute submissionto papal authority (ultramontanism) as an indispensable condition ofmembership in the Church[xv]. He wascertainly not sentimental over the fate of "Mitteleuropa": "The directinterest of Germany in the Eastern Question is so slight as not to be worththe bones of a Pomeranian musketeer[xx]." Indirectly, however, Germany hada lot to lose if Germany's nominal allies took to fighting one another,particularly if the British decided to kick in on a third front, as theythreatened to do. European) scene. Napoleon takes first credit by the simple magnitude of his actions:sweeping across Europe, employing universal conscription as an expressionof national pride, Napoleon's armies overwhelmed the regional monarchies ofEurope, successfully demonstrating the weakness of the Austro-HungarianEmpire in the process. Bismarck was neither an idealogue,nor a politician; rather, fully aware of the appointed-by-the-Prussian-ruler nature of his position, he was always a manager: "I never ask myselfif a thing is popular, only if it is reasonable and justifiable... An architect of amodern nation-state and a pan-European vision of diplomacy, Otto vonBismarck's actions were always responses to - rather than proposals for -the new reality of Germany and Europe that his century challenged him tocreate. Bismarck was always - in his domestic and internationalpolicy activities - consciously aware of the trends of history. Middle-class German liberals of the 187 s were not particularlylogically attuned to the fine points of their philosophy: that the"universal suffrage" which they espoused should, in fact, lead toempowerment of yet another under-represented class - the proletariat. Foreseeing inthe Roman Catholic Church the same political influence it exerted in theAustro-Hungarian Empire, Bismarck misread the situation to be one counterto the direction of national identity he needed to foster in the southernGerman states recently brought into Prussia's sphere of influence,particularly Bavaria. On this issue he was tactically merciless, havingno use for elected assemblies when they interfered with what he consideredthe royal prerogatives of national polity. VanNostrand Company, Inc., 1967), 7.Ralph Flenley, Modern German History from the Reformation to thePresent Day (New York: E. Faced with direct potential threats from threesides, Bismarck's international policy from the mid-187 s-on involved acombination of imperial alliance-making and the fostering of Europeanstability among the five major powers (he considered Italy too weak toworry about). Russia wasgiven hegemony over the nominally-independent Lesser Bulgaria. In this aspect he was perhaps more aware of the socio-economicnuances of those implications than their liberal advocates. P. Despite the internal autonomy of the Germanstates, in regard to tariffs, international relations, militaryorganization and general principles of law, the Reich was in control - andthe Reich was controlled by Prussia. Putnam's Sons, 1965.Simon, Walter M. But even that descriptionis misleading: by the mid-18 s agriculture had been transformed inGermany. Bismarck. Fearinga Franco-Russian alliance, squeezing Germany between them, as early as 1873Bismarck arranged the "Three Emperors' League," an agreement among KaiserWilhelm, Czar Alexander II and Austrian Emperor Franz Josef. Simon, Germany in the Age of Bismarck (London: Allen& Unwin, 1968), v.Louis L. Yet Bismarckhimself warned against such dangers - "Twenty years after my death thegreat crash will come if things go on as they are going"[ii] - his was nota personal philosophy that allowed self-destructive tendencies to grow.Rather, in pursuing a course of "Realpolitik" as opposed to blind ideology,Otto von Bismarck set a course in opposition to the major trends of hisera, trends that he was ultimately unable to control beyond his ownlifetime. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963), 129 -135.ibid., 136 - 142, 161 - 166, 241 - 248.Snyder, 4.Werner Richter, Bismarck (New York: G. The renowned "Peace of Metternich,"grounded in the barrage of treaties and liaisons the Viennese statesmanpieced together in the post-1815 era[iii], held for over three decades -until the "revolutionary" year of 1848 - and allowed the Junkers abreathing space in which to consolidate their positions. Instead, following the lead of Austrian diplomat Prince Klemens Furstvon Metternich first articulated at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), theyembarked upon an ad-libbed policy of accommodation: accepting non-Junker-appointed participation in government administration, while retaining - tolesser or greater degrees depending upon the principality - the decisive,polity-making powers to themselves. Not without effort, Bismarck's vision of developmenttriumphed. Personal politics was the key to his success.One observer at the Congress noted that the German Chancellor radiated"that charm which only those possess who have complete confidence inthemselves[xxiii]." Certainly Britain's Prime Minister, the agingDisraeli, was a bemused supporter of Bismarck's efforts - in return forinclusion of Britain's rights to take over Cyprus as part of the subsequentTreaty provisions. Although initiated into powercircles in 1848 because of his favoring the continued leadership of Austriain German affairs, as Prussian minister to the German Confederation inFrankfurt (1851-59), Bismarck increasingly saw his views evolve in adifferent vision of national interest. As Bismarck once explained to a Russian ambassador, the all-important thing was to be "à trois," to be allied with two, "that is thetrue security against coalitions.[xvi]" To that end, he was constantlyangling for British friendship but, despite a warm association withBenjamin Disraeli, was constantly put off-stride by their habit of changinggovernments every few elections and by Queen Victoria's suspicions of him(she was seemingly related to every European prince, czar or kaiser thatBismarck's gains for Germany had offended at one time or another). Constitutionally, thekaiser exercised his power through his chancellor. Despite grossmismanagement, an under-supplied army and general disarray, the Russianforces were still superior to the Ottoman's and, aided by indigenousrevolt, victory was theirs. British and Russian interests were often in conflict overdominance of the Middle Eastern waterways, where the decaying OttomanEmpire still held nominal sway along a massive border with Russia and overMiddle Eastern lands coveted by the English. P. At his moment of greatest triumph, the unification ofGermany, Bismarck was faced with very strong resistance from within theentity he created. When the year 1848 rolledaround, with its pan-European calls for radical reforms, the German farmerwas much more likely to ally himself (at least in his own mind) with theother commodity producers, the industrialists, than with those risingsocial reform movements calling for universal suffrage[iv]. The decline of the Ottomansput Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at odds, too. In this they were aided by the progress of history in the form ofthe Industrial Revolution. Urban pockets of industrialization alternated withlarger, untouched, regions of rural agriculture. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963.Henderson, W. Still, hiswas a limited achievement, all accomplishment soured by the legacy ofGerman autocratic expansionism his career left behind. although theseveral kaisers he served complained often enough of Bismarck's readinessto absorb and utilize their power and authority - indeed, given thepoisonous assertions of Bismarck's in-court enemies, the kaisers mayfrequently have had suspicions of more treasonous designs on thechancellor's part - Bismarck's personal agenda was always aimed atbettering the condition of the German empire --- and central to that goalwas the kaiser. Just asAlexander the Great's short-lived sweep across Asia Minor carried alongwith it the long-lasting influence of Greek civilization, Napoleon'sFrenchmen set up in the occupied lands governing organs of effective,republican administration sprung from the French Revolution. To that end, he recognized that Germany'sachievement had not come without a price: a hostile France ran along thesouthern border, the rumbling giant of imperial Russia met Prussia'seastern border in Poland, and the weakened Austro-Hungarian Empire - thedeposed leader of the Teutonic peoples - separated Germany from theturbulent Central European states. Austria wasallowed to annex Boznia-Hercegovina. This is progress. Otto von Bismarck: The Blood and Iron Chancellor - A Documentary-Biography. Taxes existed, yes, but the Protestant Reformation twocenturies before 1815 had broken the power of religious establishment aspracticed by the Roman Catholic Church. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. It was difficult for the noble classresuming its position of leadership, the "Junkers" in the German states, toconvincingly argue against the facts of efficiency. Snyder, Otto von Bismarck, The Blood and IronChancellor: A Documentary-Biography (Princeton: D. In coming to power during the tumultuous years prior to and following1848, Bismarck's world view was shaped by those forces of revolt.Nationalism in both the constructive and destructive sense was a prevailingattitude. Marx's KAPITAL For Beginners. Chicago: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978.Richter, Werner. Although the philosophy of liberal republicanism was introduced by aforeign occupier, the conquered peoples of the Napoleonic empire(particularly Germans) had the opportunity forced upon them to participatefirst-hand in non-monarchical government --- and it proved effective. I amthankful for even the sharpest criticism, so long as it is factual."[v] For Otto von Bismarck, the problem of nationalism in the post-1848era was the crucial one to be addressed. P. He allowed Bismarck to cajole Russiainto admission of its weak hold over the region, whereupon that admissionwas seized upon as excuse to divide Greater Bulgaria into Lesser Bulgaria(roughly contemporary Bulgaria) and the Yugoslav provinces. Bismarck, an avid andvoracious reader, was aware of that inevitable conclusion when heoriginally emerged as such a reactionary on the political scene during thecrises of 1848. Particularly when he could see clearly that theliberals had not taken the logic of their rhetoric to its inevitableconclusion. The career of Otto von Bismarck (b.1815, d.1898) - nobleman, count,prince - chancellor, diplomat, self-identified non-statesman[i] - followeda path of such contradictory influences that it is possible to view hisactions as both conservative and progressive at the same time.
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