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ALEXANDER THE GREAT'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP.
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Evaluates king's skills, accomplishments, flaws, strategies & tactics, major battles, death.... More...
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Paper Abstract:
Evaluates king's skills, accomplishments, flaws, strategies & tactics, major battles, death.
Paper Introduction:
ALEXANDER THE GREAT 356-323 B.C.
This research paper summarizes and evaluates
Alexander the Great's skills and accomplishments as a military leader and his shortcomings as well as his gifts in consolidating his victories in the realm of politics.
King at 20 and dead of fever at 33, Alexander in 13 years conquered most of the known world, generally in the face of insuperable odds. He was able to do so in part because he inherited a superb army, an alliance and a sense of mission from his father, King Philip II of Macedon, but most of all because he excelled in all the arts of war. An extraordinarily brave and inspiring leader in battle, Alexander shared the privations and sufferings of his small band of devoted followers and spurred them on to feats of endurance and courage unparalleled in ancient
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Mixter says that Alexander sizedup his enemy's intentions accurately but "the Persian commanders had notkept pace with military developments in Greece" (56). At other times, such asthe siege of the Phoenician city of Tyre mentioned below, Alexander had touse considerable ingenuity. Battle of Gaugamela (or Arbela) Alexander marched into Mesopotamia with an army of about 47, , butDarius had amassed a force of perhaps five times that size (Lucas 18). As his feats took on an almost superhuman quality, Alexander himselfappeared to accept almost routinely the belief that his mission was divine.He claimed that he was directly related through his mother with heroicfigures from the days of Troy, Priam, King of Troy and Achilles. Other Persians satraps argued that Alexander's smallforce could be stopped at the Granicus River where makeshift defenses wereimprovised. Dupuy and Dupuycalled this "one of the most grueling and difficult marches of militaryhistory" (52). This was particularly importantin ancient times because the commander, Alexander in this case, madetactical adjustment, not from the rear, but rather while he was engaged incombat, leaving very little room for error in case his instructions weremisunderstood or not instantly obeyed. Wilcken says that all this talk about equalitywith the Persians fell on deaf ears. At this time, Alexander began torefer to himself, as he did in his letter to Darius rejecting that offer asKing or Lord of all Asia. and by being prepared to secure to them their oldtraditions (87). Lucas thinks the edge went to the Macedonians not because they had abetter plan but because of their "sheer hard fighting" ability (3 ). Alexander's strategy for confronting the "strong and imposingcolossus," the Persian Empire of Darius II, was sound (Wilcken 81). Hammond's assessment is that in this and other battles in India"Alexander owed his success to his speed of movement with cavalry . Hedeveloped a square like formation, similar to the indian fighting tacticsof the American West, which enabled his formations to turn and fight in alldirections if necessary to prevent being subject to a double envelopment orbecoming surrounded. "Alexander The Great." Warfare in the Ancient World. Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1996. Alexander set up democracies"(271). At aPersian council of war, Memnon, the wiliest commander, who was from Rhodes,argued that the Persians should retreat and let Alexander's small forceoutrun its supplies. He also understood the value of religion as afighting creed in motivating his troops and in awing the populace. Battle of Issus Just before leaving the mountains of southern Anatolia, Alexander wasafflicted with a fever which delayed his progress. A less stable commander might havepanicked as he sought to figure a way out of the trap in which he foundhimself. It was unclear whetherPhilotas' motives were personal or political. According to Wilcken, Alexander "did not, however, stop at the use ofIranians in the administration and the army . Borza summarized his military genius as follows: he improved the fine army inherited from his father . Sensing at one pointa gap in the Persian line, Alexander swung left through it and beganrolling up the Persian center where Darius and his imperial guard weresituated. At about this time, Hammond says "Alexanderhad been bringing into his entourage and society his cavalry a steady flowof Asiatic aristocrats, mainly Persians" consistent with "his policy ofpartnership in the top level of civil administration" (123). Tradeand commerce flourished during his rule. New York: W. An unfortunate incident occurred in 328 while Alexander and hisofficers were relaxing in Samarkand between battles. Ernest, and Trevor N. At about the same time,Darius moved his main force from Mesopotamia into northern Syria ending upin a blocking position just north of Alexander's position there and astridehis lines of communications back to the Hellespont. His movements were marked by speed, his logistical, intelligence, and communications operations were flawless; and his ability to improvise was unrivaled. After Chaeronea, Philip had succeeded in imposing an uneasy peace onall the major Greek city-states other than Sparta and inducing them atCorinth to join a Hellenic League and to subscribe to the cause of a war ofrevenge against the Persian Empire. He wasable to do so in part because he inherited a superb army, an alliance and asense of mission from his father, King Philip II of Macedon, but most ofall because he excelled in all the arts of war. Alexander's campaign down the Phoenician coast in 333-332 wassuccessful. . However, toward the end of his life, his dream of anEurasian empire may have caused him to succumb to a touch of megalomaniaand to lose touch with his own supporters who became more and moredisenchanted with him. L. Regarded as barbarians bythe Greeks because of their lack of culture, primitive economy andwillingness to do their own fighting, the Macedonians had a highlymilitarized state centered around the king and the King's Men under arms.Philip emphasized constant drill, maneuvering and strict discipline. What appeared to be a divinelyordained mission to him seemed an exercise in Oriental tyranny or at leastan exercise in vainglory by many others. 1997: 5 -57.Wilcken, Ulrich. During the siege of Tyre, which took sevenmonths, Alexander ordered his engineers to build a causeway out to the cityitself which was built on an island a half mile from the shore andsurrounded by a 15 wall and attacked it with fire ships from the seawardside. by the addition of allied forces; he strengthened the cavalry arm, utilized weapons specialists, and employed a corps of engineers, he was invincible in both siege warfare and set battles. Hismarriage with the Sogdian princess Roxane was a love match, but like a goodpolygamist he later married daughters of Darius and his predecessor,clearly politically-inspired marriages. The Persians had once again underestimatedtheir foe for whom they had contempt and which they thought they couldtrample under with their larger force. "Alexander's First Great Victory." Military History 14 Dec. Fortunately for his historical reputation,he died before these tendencies became more pronounced. Alexander was furious with them butwas forced to make plans to withdraw from India and return to Persia.Hammond says the anabasis, the drive eastwards, was at an end" (168).Sending part of his force ahead by sea through uncharted waters from theIndus River basin to the Persian Gulf, the bulk of his forces headed eastthrough the desert of Baluchistan (Gedrosia). Darius once more fled.Alexander in hot pursuit nearly let his right flank fold but returned tothe battlefield in time to destroy the rear of the attackers. It also showed, says Hammond, Alexander's"immediate grasp of the tactical situation, his coordination of all arms ina coordinated attack, and his ingenuity in combining the initial assaultwith the extension of his line upstream" to avoid his being outflanked(66). And he ordered 1 , liaisons of Macedonian soldiers withnative women converted into marriages, via mass shotgun weddings which hefinanced. Command: A Historical Dictionary of Military Leaders. The keys to Alexander's tactics were mobility,coordination and independent movement. Hehad come through countless battles relatively unscathed and had madeseemingly miraculous recoveries from a number of extremely dangeroussituations. His first steps in 33 were to send most of his Greekshome, since his mission on behalf of Greece had been largely accomplished.He, however, expected, and indeed ordered his Macedonians to stay and sharehis dreams of world conquest. . So, it was on to India through some of thehighest, mountainous and most rugged terrain and most fiercely independenttribes in the world. The success of Alexander's pell-mell, impetuous charge depended onthe disciplined battle tactics of the Macedonians, what Hornblower calls "akind of 'hammer and anvil' manoeuvre which relied on Parmenio holding firmwith the Macedonian left, and on the infantry phalanx standing its groundin the centre" (273). He pursued his objectives rationally andimaginatively with the full force of his being. N. Invasion of Asia Minor In 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont with a relatively smallforce, approximately 43, infantry, 12, of whom were Macedonians andthe rest Greeks, and 6, cavalry, 1,8 Macedonian (Maihafer 63). To this must be added great daring, courage and inspirationalabilities. No matterhow loyal, disciplined and competent this cadre might be, he could not rulethis vast expanse of territory to the East with only Macedonians in seniorpositions in the army and in senior civilian posts. Setting for Alexander's Conquests According to Hammond, from Philip (383-336) "Alexander was toinherit the most formidable army in Europe" (15). However, activeopposition was still confined to relatively few people because during thenext three years his Macedonians suffered with him the travails of theIndian expedition and fighting until they balked at going further. Their motives were personal,but they implicated the court historian Callisthenes who had previouslyincurred Alexander's wrath by refusing to obey his request that theMacedonians at Asian functions pay homage to him by performing proskynesis,rendering obeisance by rendering themselves prostrate in his presence whichCallisthenes regarded "characteristic of oriental despotism and as anathemato freedom-loving Greeks and Macedonians" (Hammond 157). The most controversial aspect of Alexander's career apart from hisunbridled temper, particularly when he was under the influence of strongdrink, was the seemingly boundless nature of his ambitions and his pursuitfor personal glory. ALEXANDER THE GREAT 356-323 B.C. . King at 2 and dead of fever at 33, Alexander in 13 years conqueredmost of the known world, generally in the face of insuperable odds. Devinethought the fighting of the battle showed Alexander's superiority in"tactical improvization" which only a battle-hardened and battle-disciplined army used to cooperation and rapid movements and changes ofbattle order could have accommodated (114). Military History. Conclusion Alexander was a great military genius, a man of unparalleled gifts asa military and a political leader. During this trek, Hammond says "the army suffered dreadfully fromintense heat, shortage of water, and exhaustion" (177). Works CitedBorza, Eugene N. At the same time, the Army Assembly ordered the execution ofAlexander Lyncestes, one of Alexander's oldest friends and earliestsupporters, who had been under suspicion of taking a bribe from Dariussince 334. Wilcken saysthat Memnon had little chance "against the superior siege-craft ofAlexander" and his corps of engineers (93). In some cities, he appointed Macedonians with thePersian title of satrap, but Hornblower says that since in most cities"Persia had supported oligarchies . Second, he could match the vast wealth of thePersians and in fact was virtually broke after he entered Asia Minor. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.Hackett, Sir John (Ed.). Alexander had seized the moment, deciding and acting quickly. It wasan inspired stroke of strategic opportunism" (111). The Genius of Alexander The Great. As they did so, they opened up a gap.The Persians struck the flank of the charging Companions hard but wererepulsed by a reserve Alexander had posted to meet that eventuality. For one of the few times in his life, Alexander, says Maihafer, "wasboth outsmarted and outmaneuvered" (65). He was not insane, butrather vainglorious, but in his pursuit of power without limit he cameclose to crossing the line between human and inhuman ambition on the otherside of which lies megalomania. . Parmenio's son, Philotas, was accused and convicted by thearmy Assembly of Friends of conspiring to assassinate Alexander and wasexecuted. Most cities along the coast surrendered without fighting but thePersian naval bases of Miletus and Halicarnassus, commanded by Memnon, hadto be besieged before it fell. Warfare in the Ancient World. He foundedthe city of Alexandria and received a much disputed secret message from theoracle of Ammon which reportedly identified him as a son of Ammon, a Greekgod, a myth in which Alexander himself may have come to believe and whichin any event his followers propagated. Alexander The Great. If he was notgoing to form a defensive line in central Persia, then he would need thecooperation of the conquered peoples who lay across his lines ofcommunication. Sometimes patience andbattering ram tactics were all that were required. These skills, plus agood balance of ruthlessness and moderation enabled him to avoid thepitfalls of many conquerors. Trans. Nevertheless,Philotas' treachery in 33 and Cleitus's incautious remarks in 328 whichcost him his life were the exception and not the rule. With about 2 , of his men, he faced in the area of the modernprovince of Punjab in Pakistan 35, warriors of the King Porus and his2 war elephants. Alexander's contraction of malaria in 323 cut short his plans forworld conquest and caused his premature death. Hammond says "a decisive factor in the policy of Alexanderwas the small number of Macedonian citizen troops in Asia" (187). He especially treated Athens leniently because he knew he wouldneed its fleet to counter the large Persian naval threat. In retrospect, it is a measure of Alexander's popularity and abilityto inspire his men that opposition to him among the Macedonians grew asslowly as it in fact did. His treatment of Darius' remains and hisfamily as well as his payment of all debts incurred by Macedonians wereways of showing respect to the Persian aristocracy. he did everything possible to conciliate Persian opinion" (121). Alexander, refusing to be rattled, made a thorough reconnaissanceof Darius' dispositions, seized some key mountain passes to cover hisescape routes and placed Parmenio on his left with instructions to anchorhis flank against the sea. From Alexander's point of view, both his religious instincts and hispractical ruling sense guided him in the direction of reducing hisdependence on the Macedonians and accepting Persians and Medes on the basisof equality in his expanding Kingdom of Asia. The Encyclopedia of Military History. Hereorganized his battle formations to include the concept of concentrationof force first developed by the Theban general Epaminondas through hisoblique order of battle. The Greek World 479-323 BC. He hadalso carried out a classic feint, a threatened attack on the Persians'extreme left flank which exposed a gap their left center to his headlongcharge which ripped open their defenses. His dream of uniting Macedonians and Persians, really Europe andAsia, the Occident and the Orient, was beyond any man's reach, evenAlexander's no matter how long he lived. but went beyond it to theidea of a race-fusion of his Macedonians with these Iranians" (246). However, hewanted much more. Free of any political ideology otherthan belief in Greek civilization and his own destiny, he was ruthlesstoward his enemies but surprisingly moderate toward many individuals andpeoples he conquered. Hammond says thatat the time Alexander regarded Callisthenes, whom he had executed, asrepresentative of a growing conspiracy among a growing number of Greek andMacedonian malcontents opposed to his Asian policies. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. If they could not share his dreams, they could go home. He couldentertain thoughts of an Asian empire because his general Antipater hadkept the Greeks in line by defeating Sparta. 1 4-129.Dupuy, R. . Despite the huge numerical disparity, Alexander's forces attackedfirst on their right and drifted obliquely to the right causing the Persiandefenders to shift in that direction. Invasion of India and Return to Persia 327-324 Alexander with a multinational army of about 75, invaded thewestern part of India through the mountain passes northwest of Kabul,including the Khyber Pass, and descended into the valley of the IndusRiver. Richards. 1995: 62-69.Mixter. W. One measure of that success was his post-humous influence onwarfare. The Phoenician campaign, combined with the death of Memnon, theleader of the Persian navy, effectively ended for time being the Persiannaval threat in the Aegean Sea. In 324 at Opis near Babylon Alexander was confronted with a mutinyover his decision to send home about 1 , older or wounded Macedonianswho he felt were unfit for further combat. To fight in theseinhospitable regions, Alexander often had to divide his forces into small,independent units and in preparation for the campaign, Hammond says he"trained two new groups of light-armed cavalry, mounted javelin-men andmounted infantrymen" (128). Then Alexandertook two actions just before his death which further alienated the Greeksordering the city-states to take back all their exiles and requesting thatthey recognize him as a deity and also that grant heroic honors to hisfriend Hephaestion who had recently died. Histroops therefore did what many thought was impossible. . The Macedonians felt, he says, "thatthey were the victors, and they looked down with contempt on the vanquishedOrientals, whose masters they intended to be" (251). His first steps were forced marches at amazing speeds into thedesolate wastes of eastern and northern Persia, Hyrcania and Parthia, insearch of Darius in 33 and then for his murderer, Bessus, and hissuccessor, Spitamenes. The royal cities of Babylon and Persepolis surrendered to Alexander.He looted and burned Persepolis in 33 as a final act to avenge the Greekscore with the Persian Empire which was more than a century and a half old.Then, however, he gave Darius and his wife, who had also died, royalburials and treated Darius' mother with respect. they held firm while Darius lost his nerve at acritical point in the battle and fled the battlefield, thus unnerving hisforces which could not hold together thereafter against the furiousassaults of the Macedonians. He wisely let the League condemn Thebesto be razed to the ground and then implemented that decision withmoderation. John R. On this occasion, one of his senior officers,Cleitus, who was also under the influence at a banquet, made a slightingremark concerning Alexander's supposed divinity and "denounced the Asianpolicy of Alexander" (Hammond 15 ). It was during this period that the first conspiracy against Alexanderwas hatched. He appointed many Persiansto key positions while ensuring that Macedonians held control overfinances. Norton, 1967.----------------------- 22 Dupuy and Dupuy, themselves students of the Vietnam War, state thatAlexander's "accomplishments in mountain warfare and against irregularforces have never been equalled" (52). In one assault on a strongly fortified city,Alexander was wounded by an arrow which punctured his lung. They lived entirelyoff the land in hostile territory for more than two years. G. Alexander carried little about the usualaccoutrements of power, wealth and pomp, but he progressively with eachvictory grew less tolerant with attempts by his cohorts to tame or moderatehis ambitions. He succeeded in those goals and in spreading Greek civilizationthroughout Western Asia, one of his most lasting legacies. Inthe end, he was left alone at the pinnacle of power, brought down by thatmost common of human enemies, the mosquito. 11-12.Robert Cowley, and Geoffrey Parker (Eds.). Alexander led the charge by hiselite Companion Calvary on his right which was a near run thing involvingferocious hand to hand fighting and the near decapitation of Alexanderhimself. Hammond says that "these actions showed that Alexander did notintend to disestablish the royal family and the leading statesmen of Persia. This research paper summarizes and evaluatesAlexander the Great's skills and accomplishments as a military leader andhis shortcomings as well as his gifts in consolidating his victories in therealm of politics. Alexander further refined this formationwhich Devine described as follows: "Alexander's wedge was a complex ofunits arranged en echelon with two oblique lines, slanting in oppositedirections but meeting in a broad point" (121). . . According to Hackett, the Battle of Granicus River "highlightsAlexander's ability to size up a situation quickly and his readiness todeliver a direct coup de main when nothing more subtle was required. Wilcken says "the victory at Issus produced agreat change in Alexander himself" (1 6). Forthe Battle of Gaugamela, Darius selected a flat plain which favored thedeployment of a large force which Alexander thoroughly scouted. Hethen exploited the gap in the Persian lines and, as at Issus, smashedthrough the left-center of the Persian line. He wished to reconcilethem to the new rule, by taking into account of their nationalcharacteristics . .he completely changed the face war (121). Hemight have acted like a conqueror, established a defensive line through themiddle of Persia and retired to Macedonia. Eds. Up until the time he defeated Persia, they weresomewhat masked behind the mission of avenging past wrongs committed by thePersians against the Greeks and his desire to recover the Greek cities ofAsia Minor. Before he could learn of his son's death and mount any kind ofthreat, Parmenio on Alexander's orders was also killed although noconvincing evidence against him ever was produced. Philip'ssuccesses in Greece and his reorganization of the Macedonian Army providedhim a sound foundation for his later triumphs, but he far exceeded theaccomplishments of his father or anyone else, including the greatconquerors such as the Romans, Genghis Khan and Napoleon Bonaparte whoemulated him. Alexandertook a detour to Gordium and with his sword reportedly cut the Gordianknot, thus adding to his lustre as a superhuman force and man of destiny. Legendhad it that whoever could separate a shaft from the yoke of an oxcart on anancient Phrygian palace of King Midas would become Lord of Asia. Power, as has been noted, is theultimate aphrodisiac and, as Lord Acton stated, power corrupts and absolutepower corrupts absolutely. An extraordinarily braveand inspiring leader in battle, Alexander shared the privations andsufferings of his small band of devoted followers and spurred them on tofeats of endurance and courage unparalleled in ancient history. Alexanderprevailed after launching complicated flanking movements on both sides andthe rear of Porus' ranks and throwing the elephants into confusion andcausing mixups between them and the Indian cavalry. The oracleat Ammon had apparently led him to believe that he was the son of a god. New York: Military P, 1988.Maihafer, Harry J. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1997.Hornblower, Simon. Sir John Hackett. Nevertheless, as noted above, heproceeded with great caution, first securing his flank along theMediterranean coast and in East, gathering reinforcements and provisioninghis army before proceeding inland for the final showdown with Darius innorth-central Mesopotamia in September 331. Alexander's tactical and strategic genius as a military leader wascoupled with remarkable political astuteness which enabled him to retainand capitalize upon his conquests. London: Methuen, 1983.Lucas, James (Ed.). Instead, he began to act like hewas the King not of just the Macedonians or them, the Medes and Persiansbut of all Asia. Alexander was as much a master of the siegegun, catapult and ballista, as he was of the war of movement. Basically, the Macedonians used combined arms,really the forerunner of artillery, catapults, cavalry, which were armedwith 16 feet long lances or sarissas attacked on an angle and were lined upin a delta-shaped, wedge-formation, and were supported by dense and solidphalanxes (the Hypaspists), eight rows deep and armed with pikes, lighterinfantry, archers and others. . Ever since he had defeatedthe Persians in 33 and even before launching his expeditions further East,he began his policy of assimilation in Persia and Media. When he was in Bactria, some of the Royal Pageswere implicated in a plot to kill the King, tortured until they hadadmitted their crime and executed by stoning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996.Devine, Albert. .,his artillery and his assault troops in sieges, and the skill ofsubordinate commanders such as Craterus and Ptolemy," who later became apharaoh of Egypt (162). Neither Alexander norhis father held liquor well. Alexander, therefore,resisted the temptation for more than two years to seek out the Persianhost in the interior, preferring to destroy its naval bases along theMediterranean littoral. C. Ed. Dupuy. Particularly in the early stages of his Asian campaign, thesmall size of his Macedonian force required him to pursue strategies andtactics which minimized his own casualties. . These operations took him into parts of modernAfghanistan, Bactria and Sogdiana, and the steppes of Central Asia in andaround Samarkand, where he fought the Scythians in 329. In 332 he entered Egypt in triumph where he was welcomed as asavior from the detested Persians and made a man-god Pharaoh. He correctly surmised that Darius intended toattack on Alexander's left, but concentrated his main cavalry forces, bothhis Companions and the swift Thessalian Cavalry on the right under hispersonal command, and then launched an all-out charge against the left-center, Alexander's right-center, of the Persian line. He tended tohis wounded and the needs of his troops. As he drove down the coast of AsiaMinor his court historian Callisthenes noting the favorable confluence ofweather conditions on his military operations took the line that "Alexanderis made out to be a superhuman divine being, to whom the elements dohomage" (Wilcken 95). Alexander's campaign in the East from Persia all the way to Indiarequired a new approach to logistical support since the distances betweenstrong points were great and local populations were basically hostile.Alexander's response was to spread the wealth where he could to win supportand to establish new settlements, such as Kandahar, where he could not, toprotect his rear and to supply his baggage trains. . Devine says it was greater than that of any other leader inhistory, with the possible exception of Napoleon, and the militarysystem he established prevailed until the second century BC. When Alexander arrived at the scene and saw their weaknesses,he overrode the advice of his senior general Parmenio to rest and waitovernight and ordered an immediate attack. The Greeks complied with hisrequests, but did so amidst complaints that he was acting like a tyrant.Actually, the decision to force them to take back their exiles was an actdesigned to effect political reconciliation and greater stability among thecity-states which Alexander was now strong enough to enforce. This was the context, therefore, in which Alexander in theperiod after his return from India began to make plans to explore and, ifnecessary, to conquer what was left of the known world, places he had heardabout such as Carthage, the advanced African settlement of the Phoenicianswho had given him so many headaches at Tyre, Spain, Sicily, the areassurrounding the Black Sea and the mysterious Arabian peninsula. They exchanged personal insults. New York: Facts on File, 1989. He was not profligate in theuse of his men and exposed himself to the same risks they did. One indication that disaffection was spreading was the conspiracy ofthe Royal Pages in 327. As Alexander proceeded down the Western coast of Asia Minorliberating Greek populated cities, he replaced existing rulers withwhatever sets of new rulers he thought would be welcomed by the populaceand protect his rear. However, Hammond says thatAlexander "knew now that he could not trust even his closest MacedonianFriends" and took steps to split in two the command of the Army in Asia(133). The year 33 represented a sharp break in Alexander's career. According to Wilcken, he came not as a devastator but as the futureruler who saw in the conquered peoples his subjects. He knew how to consolidate his gains, when toaccept surrender rather to engage in senseless slaughter and how totranslate the fear of his defeated enemies into fealty. When some of them became restive,Alexander put down a revolt in Thebes and then appeared before them andforced them to declare him Hegemon. Alexander himself had been imbued by his mother Olympias with astrong religious faith. . This provoked to his surprise ageneral outcry of rage which Hornblower says "shows that the grievance[against his opening the Army to Asians] was felt not only by theMacedonian officer class but by the rank and file" (289). AtAsian functions, Alexander dressed in Median dress and adopted Persianrites at ceremonial functions. Hissmall Athenian navy was no match for the huge Persian fleet which could atany time cut him off from his supply base in Europe. "Alexander the Great." Military History. He knew how to expand the power of his smallconquering force by accommodating to local custom and by making clever useof religious beliefs. In 329 his forces crossed the snowy Hindu Kush mountain in mid-winter and advanced to the Oxus River where rafts were improvised out oftents stuffed with hay and ladders were erected over steep ravines.Eventually, Bessus was killed and Spitamenes was captured. Steps he took in thatdirection included the drafting of Persians into the Companion Cavalry andthe ranking of the Persian Royal Cavalry Guard on a part with the CompanionCavalry. At the Battle of the Hydaspes in March 326, Alexandersurprised Porus by landing on Porus' flank suddenly by making a pre-dawnriver crossing after a forced march during a stormy night. He recoveredand wished to push onto to the Ganges River plain in eastern India but hismagnificent Macedonian officers after having marched 11,25 miles with himfirmly refused to advance another step. New York: Facts on File, 1989.Hammond. Overall Assessment Alexander accomplished more militarily with his small force in ashort period of time than anyone in history before or since. He also showed his uncanny ability to launchsurprise operations on the enemy's flank such as his night crossing of theDanube. Aristotle had taught him that Asia began at the Nile andended at the Indian Ocean. The more deeply he penetrated intothe remote areas of Afghanistan, the more the fighting became guerrillawarfare. Whether he could have realized his plans for furtherconquests or stumbled over their grandiosity, will never be known, butAlexander probably was well down the road of biting off more than he couldchew. . Onething led to another and Alexander ran Cleitus through with a long lancefor which he went into deep remorse and despair for several days. The battle showed the superiority of the Macedonian long lance overthe Persian short spear. Yet he was careful in strategy (11). Above all, he believed in himself and his cause. Final Preparations and Alexander's Death When Alexander returned to Persia, he found the natives to berestless and had to take steps to restore order and to cashier officialswho had taken advantage of his absence to enrich themselves. In the battle itself, Alexander maintained in the reara thin phalanx of Thessalian infantry which, according to Dupuy and Dupuy,"was probably the first recorded use of a tactical reserve" (49). Final Defeat of the Persians After the Battle of Issue, Alexander had a decision to make whetherto accept Darius' offer, made after Alexander captured his mother, wife andchildren, to cede the western Persian Empire (plus the equivalent of $3 million) or to seek unconditional victory. "Upset at Issus." Military History 11 Feb. He also arranged at Susa in 324 theweddings of 8 leading Macedonians with Persian, Median and Bactrianaristocrats. Eventually,Darius was murdered by his own followers. G. After Alexander became king in 337 following his father'sassassination, he had to eliminate opposition within palace circles andquell revolts in the Balkans among the Illyrians (Albanians) and Thracians.In these northern campaigns, Alexander displayed the same courage he haddisplayed in 338 where at the battle of Chaeronea he had led the cavalrycharge which enabled Philip's forces to defeat decisively the Thebans andtheir Athenian allies. Darius had picked broken groundwhich somewhat limited the effectiveness of his superiority in numbers. He took astrong interest in the condition of the critical irrigation and floodcontrol systems in Mesopotamia and strengthened them immeasurably. In 33 /329, he ordered the training of 3 , local boys assoldiers which he intended to take with him on his Arabian campaign.
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