|
| |
COMPARES MAO ZEDMG & CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
Term Paper ID:28899
|
|
|
Essay Subject:
Approaches to international law & nationalism. Chinese Communist Party. Status of Taiwan. U.N. Admission. Issue of Tibetan sovereignty.... More...
|
15 Pages / 3375 Words
11 sources, 25 Citations,
APA Format
$60.00
Return to List of Papers
|
Paper Abstract:
Approaches to international law & nationalism. Chinese Communist Party. Status of Taiwan. U.N. Admission. Issue of Tibetan sovereignty.
Paper Introduction:
Introduction
Any comparison between Mao Zedong's and Chiang Kai-shek's differing approaches to International Law should start with a comparison between their different conceptions of nationalism. In turn, these different conceptions were born out of a distinct ideological, and, at times, different practical approach to the needs of modern Chinese society and, more specifically, to what steps were to be taken to solve them. These distinct ideologies determined Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's vision of China as a sovereign state, but only in part.
In many ways, Mao and Chiang Kai-shek were both children of the 1911 Revolution and both of them found inspiration in the thinking of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the chief ideologist of that revolution. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's first and foremost aim was the elevation of China to a po
Text of the Paper:
The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen's firstand foremost aim was the elevation of China to a position of freedom andequality among the nations, away from the state of subservience originallyimposed by foreign powers thanks to the growing weakness of the ManchuDynasty. We shall now look at some specific historical examples which can helpus to illustrate Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's approaches to internationallaw. At this time, the CCP's alliance with the Kuomintang in the unitedfront against the Japanese meant that the issues of class struggle anddemocratic revolution were temporarily relegated to a second place vis-à-vis the issue of national liberation. Given the original common purpose uniting Communists andNationalists, it can be argued that even if quite different ideologiesinformed Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's conception of nationalism, in the endthey both dealt pragmatically with the same international system of rules. (1972). At the end of the process, the PRC had become anautonomous, self-reliant power of its own, 'au par' with other world powersand a national entity which had largely recuperated the ancient grandeur ofthe Manchu empire. Selected Works, Vol. This declaration, followedformally by the Postdam Proclamation of July 1945, was also adhered to bythe USSR and France. THE TIBET QUESTION Similarly to the Taiwan Question, the issue of Tibetan sovereignty isa further example of how Mao's and Chiang kai-shek's approach tointernational law runs along practically identical lines. They never changed theirfundamental legal position according to which Taiwan has been a 'de jure'Chinese territory since the 1941 abrogation of the Shimonoseki Treaty, and'de facto' Chinese since Japan's surrender on September 2, 1945 (Weng,1972, 165). Since then, the Chinese Communists have always referred to the"liberation" of Taiwan as one of their objectives. 79-223. Hunt, M.H. Thisattitude was in evident contradiction with the avowed principle of nationalself-determination, which, in theory should have been applied to all ethnicgroups, including those living along the original Chinese imperial border. In 1895, at the end of the first Sino-Japanesewar, China and Japan signed a peace treaty at Shimonoseki by which imperialChina ceded to the victorious Japan the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and thePescadores Group. II, pgs. (1972). The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy,pgs. The Tibetans were able to maintain that independence for so long- an independence which no foreign power recognized 'de jure' - simplybecause the Chinese governments of the Republic were either too weak or toooccupied with civil war, or with the struggle against Japan, to reincludethat country within the original imperial borders. Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915-1949,pgs.151-159. On the other hand, one of the PRC's most cherished principles ofinternational law is that of sovereignty. In conclusion, Regardless of their different ideologies, both Mao'sCommunists and Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists never renounced China'srights over Tibet in face of the fact that Chinese claim to suzerainty overthis country is, in international law, quite unchallengeable. By the end of the 195 s, the riftbetween the PRC and the USSR began and led to the final accusation by theChinese Communists against their former mentor: that of practicing a formof social imperialism. THE STATUS OF TAIWANOver the years and to this day, the "Taiwan Question" has been one of themost difficult but important problems in the world. Thisrestitution included Taiwan and the Pescadores. It was at this juncture in thepolitical struggle for power that the Kuomintang lost the civil war againstthe Communists (Bianco, 1967, 159). In 1941, Chiang Kai-shek's government declared as void all previousagreements and contracts regarding China's relations with Japan. (1996). (1957). Han superiorityover ethnic and national groups along the border. The United Nations, Law in Chinese Foreign Policy,pgs.196-217. Chiu, H. He portrays the Communists as a party opposed to theNational Revolution as theoretized by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This should notsurprise us, precisely because China is considered one of the Big Five. From that moment onwardsthe issue of Taiwan status became a major one in international politics. In his famous book "The Three Principlesof the People," based on a series of lectures he gave before passing away,he reminded to his followers about the importance of Nationalism as afundamental instrument to obtain China's freedom (Yat-sen, 1981, 1-38) Infact, nationalism was the first and most important of Dr. Sun Yat-sen'Three Principles. Between 1945 and 1949, the official year of the Chinese CommunistRevolution, while Chiang Kai-shek's government was relying more and more onAmerican help against the Communists, Mao's party came to be perceived, notonly by the peasant masses, but also by many members of the intellectualélite, as the most consistent inheritor of the nationalist faith. To understand it fullywe need to go back in time. On June 26, 195 , U.S.President Harry Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan.Beijing's reaction was quite harsh. Until his own death, Chiang Kai-shek saw himself as the true an onlysuccessor of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's legacy as leader of the Kuomintang(literally the National People's Party), whose ultimate objective was toliberate China from foreign domination as well as, supposedly, to set thecountry on the road to political and social democracy (Kai-shek, 1957, 3). THE ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONSThe issue of Communist China's admission to the United Nations is closelyrelated to the question of Taiwan as a sovereign entity separated from themainland. It also applied Chinese laws and generally exercised sovereignrights over the islands (Weng, 1972, 124). Basically, Chinese Communists have been viewing international law asa political instrument for adjusting inter-state relationships and forimplementing foreign policy objectives. The Chinese Communist Party gave official support to theestablishment of the United Nations as early as April 24, 1945. (1961). Snow, E. At the Simla conference to which Britain, China and Tibet tried toregulate the affairs of that country and define its frontiers, the so-called MacMahon Line was born. The same position toward this world institution was taken by ChiangKai-shek. Selected Works, Vol. In 1949,he finally made it very clear, although privately, that the CCP's intentionwas to retake Tibet and Taiwan and gather in all nationalities in a singleChina (p.223). Yet, however different Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's conceptions ofnationalism might be, they are not necessarily reflected in theirapproaches to international law. Mao sees his attitude toward foreign entities in direct contrast tothat of the Kuomintang during the war of liberation against Japan. For the next forty years noChinese government was able to control the era adjacent to that line and asa consequence both Britain and the Dalai Lama's regime treated it as the'de facto' frontier. Regardless of their different ideologicalbackground, after 1949, Mao and Chiang Kai-shek considered themselves asrightful representatives of the Chinese Nation. Exactly because the international proletarian revolution envisaged bymarxist-leninist ideology never took place, international law has remaineda system dictated by a compromise between lofty universal ideas and theharsh realities of national power politics. It may be noted that the Constitution of the ROC provides,amongst other things, that the foreign policy of the Republic of Chinashall respect the Charter of the United Nations (Chiu, 1972, 217). When in August 195 the U.S. Consistently with its internationalist ideology, the CCP was evenmore emphatic in supporting the world community of the abused, yet when itcame to the issue of the border nationalities, like the Nationalists, itapplied an undying feeling of superiority by the Chinese. The PRC saw Truman's decision as anarmed aggression against the territory of China. In fact, this principle is theone which has been most often invoked in its condemnation of imperialistaggression. Exactly because of itsconsistent opposition to the "two-China" or "one China and one Taiwanconcept," the PRC always claimed to be the sole legal representative ofChina to the UN. Consistently,neither ever signed any agreement recognizing the 'de facto' independenceof Tibet. The incontrovertible fact remains that Mao and his followerssucceeded in achieving this objective, while Chiang Kai-shek's regime wasin the end left to rule over a fraction of the former Chinese empire andonly thanks to the open support of a foreign power, i.e. Consistently with this approach, the PRC has generally opposedthe expansion of the role of international organizations in fear that theymight encroach upon areas of state sovereignty (Chiu, 1972, 198). 318-444. The outbreak of theChinese revolution of 1911 brought China's authority in Tibet to a suddenend. Although the PRC's strategies tactics for uniting Taiwan to themainland have changed throughout the years, ranging from direct assault tosecret negotiations, the fact remains that, the agreement between theCommunist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan remains the same.They both see the island is an integral part of China as a result of thesecond Sino-Japanese War and for both any "two China" proposition must berejected. (1981), The Three Principles of the People, pgs.1-38. 118-9). In the end, hebelieves that since the Communists' objective is to practice Communism inChina, they are, in reality, a counterrevolutionary force and they have tobe dealt as such (Chiang Kai-shek, 1957, p.7-11). This pledge was reneged during the second Sino-Japanesewar. (eds.), pgs.124-137. As a consequence, the PRC, moreoften than not, has found it to her interest to observe existing normsregulating international relations or to use principles of "bourgeois"international law to support her position or condemn the actions of others(Leng and Chiu, 1972, x). To each of them, their own state was asovereign entity to be reckoned in the larger society of nations. From the beginning of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its primaryforeign policy preoccupation has been imperialism. In the end, as Mao conceived it, self-determination wastheoretically possible, but in practical terms unlikely (p.134). 96. Tse-tung, M. Kai-shek, C. (1972). But at the same time, most likely out of political considerationsbased on self-interest, the PRC, like the ROC has always been supportingthe Big Five's veto privilege under the UN Charter. In turn, these differentconceptions were born out of a distinct ideological, and, at times,different practical approach to the needs of modern Chinese society and,more specifically, to what steps were to be taken to solve them. Over the years, even Chiang Kai-shek recurring argument against Mao'ssuccess, that it was obtained mainly thanks to the political and economicsupport of another foreign power, i.e the USSR, could not find anyconfirmation in the reality of things. administration sent the Seventh Fleet todefend Taiwan against possible Chinese Communist invasion, the PRC showedits recognition of the importance of the UN when it requested the SecurityCouncil to take action against what it saw as a US "aggression in theTaiwan Straits." Until it was finally admitted to the UN on November 15, 1971, the PRCgave the impression to the rest of the world that it would gain more bystanding outside this world institution. In reality, Mao wanted toblock foreign penetration (in this particular case British plans to revivethe Tibetan kingdom) and to reserve to a future strong and united China theright of directing border peoples, including Tibetans, toward a betterfuture. Mao's position on Taiwan has not always been the same. Introduction, Law in Chinese Policy, LengS. It was only with the establishment of the PRC that theChinese government, which had never accepted the MacMahon Line, gatheredenough strength to reoccupy Tibet. Few months later, on October 25, Chinese forces tookover Taiwan and the Pescadores from the Japanese with the help of Americantroops. 3-337. The Legal Status of Taiwan, Law in Chinese ForeignPolicy, Leng S. and Chiu H. Schram, S.R.(ed.) (1963). The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p.266. Since its establishment on October 1, 1949, the Government of the PRCnot only tried to restore what it saw as its legitimate position in the UNbut also frequently issued statements expressing firm support for the UNCharter. (eds.), p. and Chiu H. 3 6. Leng S. Yat-sen, S. This paved the way for apolicy of incorporation of these groups within a new united Chinese nation-state. By 194 , not differently from Chiang Kai-shek, Mao had no doubt inconsidering himself as the faithful and rightful successor of Sun Yat-sen.He saw Sun's nationalist doctrine as correct and well-suited to his time.It only lacked one thing to make it equally applicable to the problemoffered by the Japanese imperialist invasion: a concern with mobilizing themasses (Bianco, 1967, 151). For the new Chinese leaders one way out of this contradiction was toutilize an underlining concept of Chinese superiority, i.e. The simple fact that in 1971 the PRC was finally admitted to the UNas sole representative of China can be seen as proof of how, regardless ofMao's original ideological declarations, China's flexible and pragmaticattitude toward international law enhanced more than ever its growingposition of strength in the world arena. Although it is not entirely clear when Mao changed his idea about theimportance of Taiwan, one can presume that the Cairo Conference in 1941gave him the opportunity to reflect. The 'de facto' division between mainland China and Taiwan started inOctober 1, 1949, when the Communists inaugurated the PRC, and the ROCofficials flew to Taiwan and set up their headquarters there in earlyDecember. CONCLUSIONWhat unites Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's thinking about internationalrelations was, retrospectively, an identical objective: the creation of afuture China as a unified, strong national entity in contrast with thedivided, weak nation state inherited from the Manchu dynasty. Soviet Russia in China, pgs. Again, the source of disagreement between Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek'sgovernments was not to be found in a different approach to internationallaw, since both abided to the UN Charter. References Bianco, L. One of its crucialobjectives was to free China from the shackles of foreign encroachment.Yet, by the time of his death in 1925, Dr. Sun Yat-sen saw the job ofrevolution as far from completed. (1967). Mao Tse-tung, who had regarded its predecessor, the League of Nations, as "a Leagueof Robbers by which various imperialism's are dismembering China," (Schram,1963, 266) saw instead the UN as "an institution to preserve internationalpeace and security" (Tse-Tung, 1965, 3 6) and sent his own team ofrepresentatives to join the Chinese delegation at the San FranciscoConference. Between that date and June 26, 195 , the Republic of China underChiang Kai-shek's leadership ruled over Taiwan as a province of China,restoring Chinese nationality to all inhabitants of Taiwan and thePescadores. Thesedistinct ideologies determined Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's vision of Chinaas a sovereign state, but only in part. x. Conversely, without the successfuloverthrowing of imperialism, the rule of the feudal landlord class couldnot be ended, because imperialism was its main support (Tse-tung, 1967, p.318). For this reason, until the so-called "Chiang Kai-shekclique" was not expelled it would have been impossible for Communist Chinato have anything to do with this world organization (Chiu, 1972, 2 5). Tse-tung, M. That is why, according to Mao, China was in no hurryto join the UN (Chiu, 1972, 196). As leaders, respectively,of the mainland based People's Republic of China (PRC), and of the Taiwanbased Republic of China (ROC). Thebasic policy of the CCP, he declares, is to use all possible foreign help,subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and relianceon the party's own efforts, as against the Kuomintang, which abandons thisprinciple by relying entirely on foreign help or hanging on to oneimperialist bloc or another (Tsetung, 1967, 444). Throughout the years their standhas been highly selective and flexible. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War that the Americanposition changed from one of military neutrality to one of active defenseof Taiwan against possible invasion by Mao's China. In many ways, Mao and Chiang Kai-shek were both children of the 1911Revolution and both of them found inspiration in the thinking of Dr. SunYat-sen, the chief ideologist of that revolution. Both Mao and Chiang Kai-shek saw themselves as the only and truenational revolutionaries, but in the end it was marxist-leninist ideology,as adapted by Mao to China's struggle against imperialism, to win the day.Mao's success was not merely a political and military conquest of theChinese state, but also an ideological victory in so far as the Chineserevolution was overwhelmingly seen, twenty-four years after Sun Yat-sen'sdeath, as the only one capable of bringing Chinese nationalism to fruition(Bianco, 1967, 165-6). In 192 Mao wroteabout helping Korea and Southeast Asia to their independence The peoples ofMongolia, Tibet were instead to be helped only to self-governing autonomy(Hunt, 1996, p. Consistently withMarxist-Leninist ideology, its fight against imperialism was intertwinedwith a democratic revolution to be achieved only through class struggle. In the eyes of Chinese Communists the rightful seat of China at theUN was usurped by Chiang Kai-shek's government. Tibet, like other border territories such as Xinjiang and Mongolia,had become part of the Chinese empire during the rule of Qianlong (1736-1796) after a series of successful military campaigns. Introduction Any comparison between Mao Zedong's and Chiang Kai-shek's differingapproaches to International Law should start with a comparison betweentheir different conceptions of nationalism. For instance, in 1959 Mao told aCosta Rican Communist leader that since Communist China was considered byWestern countries an outlaw state, it could then act without regard forlaws restricting it. Red Star Over China, p. When in 1936Edgar Snow interviewed him, he was talking about extending ChineseCommunist help in the fight for independence from Japanese imperialism notonly to Korea but also to Formosa (Snow, 1961, 96). It is interesting to observe how, on this subject, both campsdraw justification from a vision of a united Chinese nation which is morebased on historical developments and 'realpolitik' than on pure ideologicalprinciples. To illustratethis point, we need first to look at the Tibetan question within ahistorical perspective. the United States. Weng, B.S. (1971). This frontier proposed by Britain andaccepted by Tibet, was never ratified by China. This attitude seems to reflect on one hand some form of resentmentfor having been barred for so long from participating in an institutionwhich was often seen as manipulated by the United States. III, p. According to Mao, who became undisputed leader of the CCP during thewar of liberation against the Japanese between 1936 and 1945 and theensuing civil war against the Kuomintang led government, imperialist rulecould be overthrown in China only by helping the peasants in their struggleagainst the feudal landlord class. The 1911 Revolution deposed that dynasty. At the1943 Cairo Conference, the heads of governments of the United States,United Kingdom and China declared that all territories "stolen" by Japanfrom the Chinese would have to be restored to the Republic of China. He could not foresee at that time thatTaiwan would become the major obstacle to the realization of an undividedChina (Weng, 1972, 137). His weak sense of concern with liberating the weak andoppressed along China's own borders becomes even clearer in 1933, when heexpressed concern about the future of Tibet. It stemmed rather from ahistorical and political view of who should represent the Chinese people inan international forum which both equally recognized. Andagain, in his political writings, Chiang Kai-shek implicitly gives fullrecognition to the UN in its management of international crisis, althoughat the same time he sees it as a shield against international Communistaggression (Kai-shek, 1957, 337). 79). To complicate matters, although in the 1951 San Francisco Treaty ofPeace, Japan formally renounced any legal claims to Formosa and thePescadores, the contracting parties of the treaty intentionally left thelegal status of Taiwan unspecified (Weng, 1972, 126). and Chiu H. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, sees Mao's Communists as notindigenous to China, but as an outgrowth of Soviet Russia and of theCommunist empire. Nevertheless, by creating a peasantdemocracy in the areas under its control, Mao and his party succeeded inwinning the overwhelming support of the masses, a kind of support whichChiang Kai-shek's party never obtained. In "China's Destiny," published in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek describedthe Muslims of Xinjiang, the Mongols as well as the Tibetans as "clans"united to the Han and the Manchu by one nation through a long process ofongoing historical "blending" so that all five ended up making one nation.As late as 1945 the Nationalist party, while formally pledging independenceand equality for all racial groups within China, stipulated that"independence" would take the form of a "high degree of autonomy" for OuterMongolia and Tibet (Hunt, 1996, pgs. (1965). Although one of the elements of the May Fourth 1919 Movement - thesecond, more radical revolutionary wave against the old regime followingthat of 1911 - was a belief in the unity of the weak and the oppressed as aform of generalized identification with countries dominated by Westernpower, the new Chinese patriots still embraced and defended with impervioustenacity the territorial boundaries set by the Manchu dynasty. Finally, in comparing Mao's and Chiang Kai-shek's differingconceptions of nationalism as applied to the problem of Chineseindependence, it can also be useful to compare their respective criticismsof each other.
If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again:
or
Click here to request an essay written just for you.
|
|
|
